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STATE:'vlPJ''J' OF

TH~

'JA,,,URE OF THF. CASE

This is a case for wroncrful termination of an insurance
salesman·
DISPOSITIO"l OF THF CASE BT THE 101.YER COURT
Ap~ellant

challenqed the

restitution, contract and tort.

ter~ination

with three theories

The trial court

dis~issed

the

res ti tut ion claim without receiving any evidence on that issue.
Evidence was submitted on the contract and tort issues.

After

appellant's evidence, the trial court qr anted a directed verdict
in favor of respondent on the contract claim and the tort claim.
RELIEF

sour.HT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks a new trial.
I.

THE BAD FAITI! CLAIM

A.

Factual Basis for the Bad Faith Claim.

Mann is an insurance salesman.

American Western is a life

insurance company.

Mann worked for American Western for fifteen

years.

During part of that time

(R. 1251).

written agreement.

(E'x. 1-P and 109-P).

~ann

served under a

During the balance of

the time ~1ann served under an oral agreement.

(R. 1184-1186,

1252-1254, 1288, 1324).

American Western is operated basically as a pyramid plan.
IR. 1034 and 1038).

That sales approach is unique in the entire
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insurance industry.

( R. 10 31) .

Under this pyramid plan ar,

aqent really has two responsibilities:

to sell new insurance

policies and to recruit new sales ac:rents

(called sub-aaents),

Agents are paid for recruiting new sub-aqents bv

~

override commission on the production of the sub-acrent
(R. 1034-1037).

aqent.

The sub-agent can in turn recruit a sub-sub·

In that case the original agent and the sub-aaent bee:

get an override commission from sales made by the sub-sub-ace:·
Eventually there is a whole pyramid

o~

sales people

each

qetting an override on the sales of those under him in the
pyramid.

(R.

1034-1037).

The ultimate goal for an agent would be to get so many
sub-agents and sub-sub-agents that an agent could stop active
sales and live off the override commissions of the sub-acrents
(R.

1049).

Within the pyramid each agent has a responsibility to
supervise sub-agents below him in the pyramid.

However, the

(R. 1046 and 1049).

supervisory duties are minimal.

Accordinq to custom and usage, agents have an ownershir
interest in their sub-agents.

The group of sub-agents workinc

under an aqent is referred to as a "pedicrree".
were sometimes bought and sold.

These pediqre~

(R. 1199, Ex. 108-P) ·

In ot'..:

se 11 a 11 of hi' s sub-acrents to a felloi·
11 futu::
The new purchaser would then be entitled to a
agent.
ld ~,,;:
Sometimes American Nestern wou ·
(R. 1205).
overrides.

· ht
words, one agent miq
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_.,_

sJch pedigree accounts directly froi!1 an agent.

sx.

(R.

U06,

79-P) •

llann spent about 89-90% of his time recruiting subagents.

~oreover,

he had to pay his own expenses.

He paid

:or luncheons, advertising, gas, automobile, telephone,

secretary, rent, etc.

(R. 1292).

his investrnen t of time and money.

Mann received no salary for
His sole compensation was

the override if the sub-agents were successful, or indebtedness
if the sub-agents were unsuccessful.
~ann

(R.

1291).

also had the responsibility to help finance his

sub-agents.

American Western paid advances and lo"ins to the

sub-agents, but Mann had to guarantee the advances.

If the

sub-agent did not repay the loan, Mann had to pay.

(R. 1090

and 1294 I.

In this case American Western counterclaimed against

Mann for $29,550.58 because of defaults by :-ilann's sub-a<Jents.
Mann did an excellent job.

He received 16 personal

letters of commendation from the President of American Western
for his work.

(R. 1174-1179, Exhibits 12-P, 13-P, 14-P, 17-P,

19-P, 21-P, 23-P, 25-P, 26-P, 28-P, 29-P, 30-P, 31-P, 32-P,
33-P, 50-P).

In fact, in 1975 Mann and his sub-agents produced

61% of the business for the entire company.

(Ex. 62-P,

•r 4).

In the spring of 1976 United American Life of Denver took
over control of American Western.

(R. 1192).

actions of the new owners was to fire ~1ann.
he was fired.

(Ex. 54-P).

One of the first
Mann was not told

The new management did not
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inform 'tann of any alleged shortcominas in his i;ierfor:nance.
~1ann

They did not request
formance.

to nake any chancres in his perhi~

They did not warn him, nor did they qive

second chance.

(R.

1127-1129).

In fact, c1ann drove to

Denver to talk to the new owners, but they refused to
him.

(R. 1312-1313).

a

They just fired him.

s~

~s

After he

fired '1ann received no further overrides on the production
of his sub-agents.

The old management team did not agree with the decis1'"
to fire Mann.

They thought Mann should stay.

However, they were not even consulted.

(R. 1191).

The decision to fire

Mann was made by the new management team in the Denver offic:
of United American.

(R.

1104-1106).

In fact, the new owner:

decided to fire Mann without even knowing what the terms of
his employment agreement were.

(R.

1139).

At trial the new management team was asked why they
fired Mann.

They testified that the primary reason was lac\

of "on-site" supervision.

(R. 1120).

The theory was that

Mann could not supervise Schustrin and other California sub·
agents from Salt Lake City.

( R. 1110) .

However, after 'lann

was fired the company still did not provide "on-site" super·
vision for the California agents.

Instead, the California
·

·

oen•::

agents were supervised directly from the head office in
(R. 1173,cf. 1104).

·

No one explained why it was easier to
h

frc<

supervise agents from Denver to California rather t an ·
Salt Lake City to California.
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-4-

A jury could reasonably conclude that the real reason

:iann was terminated was to take advantage of sub-agents which
:~ann

had recruited, trained, and financed, without paying

overrides to Mann.
B.
i\

The Tort of Bad Faith.
well established rule of contract law is that, "every

contract implies a duty of good faith and fair dealing between
the parties
256; Zims

See generally, 17 Arn. Jur. 2d Contracts
Properties~~~Holt,

538 P.2d 1319

Recent cases have recognized that a

breac~

(Utah 1975).

of the covenant

of good faith constitutes a tort.

c:

The great landmark case in this area is Gruenberq v. Aetna

r:

Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 510 P. 2d 1032 (1973).

That case

involved a claim that an insurance company had, in bad faith,
refused to pay an insurance claim.

The court stated:

It is the oblicration, deemed to be imposed
by the law, under which the insurer must act
fairly and in good faith in discharging its
contractual responsibilities. Where in so
doing, it fails to deal fairly and in good
faith with its insured by refusing, without
proper cause, to compensate its insured for
a loss covered by the policy, such conduct
may give rise to a cause of action in tort
for breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing • • . . Accordingly,
when the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith
withholds payment of the claim of its insured,
it is subject to liability in tort.
See also:
l

7

Fletcher v. Western National Life, 10 Cal. App. 1d

6, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Escambia Tradincr v. Aetna Cas.
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&

~~rety

Co., 421 F.Supp. 1367 ('l.D. Fla. 19711);

~arrett 'I.

American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 520 S.W.2d 102 (1974);

c· ..

~-

Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
C.

90 ;-J.M. 105, 560 P.2d 169 (1976).

The Standard of Bad Faith in

Ut~h

Case Law.

This Supreme Court has had an opportunity to consider
the law of bad faith on a number of occasions.
The third case was Butterfield v. Consolidated Fuel::.
42 Utah 499

(1913).

In that case, plaintiff was a broker.

Plaintiff entered into an oral agreement to sell
for a commission.

He apparently made presentations to a :e·•

potential buyers, including one Mr. Caldwell.
the proposal.

certa~~

Caldwell

Plaintiff made no further contact

~e:::·

with Cal&•:

and the Caldwell deal was dead.
For a period of several months plaintiff failed to pre:.
any other prospective purchasers.
plaintiff and fired him.

Defendant then wrote to

After plaintiff was fired, defen:r·

contacted Caldwell to renew or rekindle the negotiations.
Caldwell agreed to reconsider the situation and did, in fac:.
purchase $400,000.00 of the bond issue.
Plaintiff sued defendant for the unpaid broker's
commission.
appealed.

The lower court granted a non-suit and plainti:'
The Supreme Court of Utah held that the i\qency

between plaintiff and defendant could be terminated at anv
time without consent of the agent.

The Court then held

t~'·

the agency had been validly revoked before the sale took , ..
and that plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to a
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cornn"''

However, the Court went to great lenaths to explain what
the result would otherwise be if there was a showinq of bad
faith:
Under the contract in question, res~ondent had
the legal right to terminate appellant's authoritv
at any time, provided it was done in good faith and not for the purpose of preventinq him from
consuITL~ating pending neaotiations to deprive him
of his commissions.
Butterfield v. Consolidated
5:_uel Co., 42 Utah 499-(1913).
Butterfield is very similar to this case.
involve the relationship of principal-aaent.
the agent was working for a commission.

Both cases

In both cases

In both cases the

9ployrnent contract was for an indefinite period.

Both cases

involve termination of the agent.
In Ensign, et al. v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 107 Utah
557, 155 P.2d 965

(1945), Ensic;m, an insurance broker, sold an

insurance policy to Airway Motor Coach Lines.
requested a change in the policy terms.

Later, Airway

Ensign tried one

telephone cal 1 to secure the new rates, but he was unable to
reach the person who could quote them.

Thereafter, Airways

bought the insurance from the same defendant insurance company
but through some new broker.

Ensign sued the insurance col'lpnny

for the lost commission.
Ensign lost the case because he had placed only a sinqle
telephone call and had not diliaently followed throuah to sell
::;ie business.

However, the Court noted that,

~or ... could it [insurance company] arbitrarily
refuse quotations to an aqent of a proper rate and
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secure the insurance throuch another at such
rate ...
To do so would evidence a lack of
fair dealina which would deprive appellants 0 ~
the contemplated fruits of their contrac~ with
respondent.
The next Utah case is State~~tomo~ile ~_Casualt? fo'e·

----'----:

'~.E.~te~2.:.. S~lisbury,

27 Utah 2d ?.29, 494 P.2d 52C1 (19i2).

That case involved the ·relationship between an insura::ice
col.lpany and its general 2.aent.

The aeneral aaent '."Ian wri:te:

an insurance policy <:or a client and issued a. "bi.nc'.er". '',;
general agent then submitted the policy to the insurance cor:c
The insurance company rejected the policy and returned it to:
general agent.

However, the insured party had an il.ccident a':'

the "binder" was issued, but before the policy was reiected
the insurance company.

t>

The insurance company honored the

"binder" by paying $19,758.71 to the insured party.

The

insurance company then sued its own general agent for wroncrf{
issuing the binder.
The issue presented for appeal was whether the qeneral
agent had a duty (contractual or otherwise) to seek aporovol
before issuing such binders.

The Court stated:

• . • each has a right to assume that the other will
perform the duties he agrees to with reasonable care,
competence, diliaence and crood faith, even thouqh
such terms are not expressiy-Sperred out in the
contract.
[Emphasis added.]
See also:
2d 261, 430 P.2d 576

(1967):

. r.

While the expressions of courts have var1esornewhat as to the duty of insurance companies
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~ t~

respect to makina and acceotina oronosals
o settlement to protect its insured,-we believe
t at the best view is that it must act in good
faith and be as zealous in protectinq the interests
of its insured as it would in lookina a:ter its
own.
~hether it discharaes that dutv mav ~ecend
upon various considerations including the certaintv
or uncertainty as to the issues o= liability and da!".'ages.
o.

Bad =aith Termination Cases.

I:1 the trial court,

Ar'lerican 'vestern araued that

·.;as subject to ter!".'.ination "with or 1·1i thout cause".
~stern

·~arm

Arnerican

=urther araued that the concept "without cause"

per~its

an employer to terminate for any reason -- even in bad faith and
with malice.
Defendant's view of the law had its roots in Enqland
during the Industrial Revolution.
was indeed King.

~vomen

At that time, the employer

and children worked for pal try waqes

in pitiful conditions and labor unions were unlawf'...11.
even permitted a system of indentured servants.

The law

However, the

law governinq relations between master and servant has evolved

to reflect more enlicrhtened views of social and economic concUtions.
So, also, has the concept of termination "without cause"
changed.

As recently as twenty years ago the term "without

cause" really meant just that.

Employees could be terminated

:or no reason and with malice and bad faith.

However, around

~~t time, thoughtful minds began to question the harsh doctrine
J'. termination "without cause".

See, e.q., Termination of
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Em?loyri.ent at \'/ill - Public ?olicy '1a•!
:«.ut~ers

to Dischar-:re, 14

L.

?.e•1.

624

;.1odi~·1

O":n:,:1 0 .:e:'s

"-

(1960): Blu!Tlrosen, £·:
-....:...::.:.,

Discipline: U.S. Report, 18 Rutsers L. ?.ev. -!28, 431-31 11 ,;
~rote,

California's Controls on Employer .ll.buse of EMployee

~olitical

Rights, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1015 (1970); Blades,

::ient at l"lill v.
~f_Employer

~rn~~-

-:..:.:_

Individual Freedoms: On Limiting Abusbe ::,;:

Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1418 (1967).

The upshot is that largely within the last decace a:;'
and dominant view has emerged in the law.

This vie1-1 hol::s:

In all employment contracts, whether at will
or for a definite term, the emclover's interest
in running his business as he see~ fit must be
balanced against the interest of the employee in
maintaining his employment, and the public's inter·
est in maintaining a proper balance between the
two •..
A termination by the employer of a
contract of employnent at will which is motivated
by bad faith, or malice, or based on retaliation
is not in the best interest of the economic systen
or the public good and cons ti tut es a breach of the
ernployITlen t con tr act.
Moncre v. Beebe Rubber Cornpanv,
316 A.2d 549 (New Hamp:-1974) y
A thoughtful law review article Makes the followinc
co!TII'\ents on the standard of good faith in the termination c'
insurance agents:
Where good faith is implied, more arbitrary
terminations of agency may be eliminated ... ·
Requirements of fairness and reasonableness in
termination of acrencv are hardl v radical c1epartures
from the 'well-s~ttl~d' principles of contract lD·

This case was included in the compilation Sicrn~
State Appellate Decisions Outline 1976, published bV t,e
~ational College of the State Judiciary.

Y
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The ooeration of the aaencv a~reenent itself reauires
subst~ntial reliance upon good faith and mutual-trust
between the parties to the workina business relationship.
To hold that such good faith princioles be
appiied to the termination provisions is only the
logical conclusion of careful contractual analysis.

* * *
Even accepting the more traditional approach to
the law of contracts, the intricate relationshin
between the termination of acrency and the interests
of the :_Jolicyholder justifies the implications of
coed faith and reasonableness.
There is, as
;reviously noted, a substantial oublic interest
ln the continuation of the relatlonship between
the agent and the company.
The parties' private
contractual aareement allowinq arbitrarv and
unjustified ternination of t~e relationship should
not be enforceable where abrupt termination contravenes the public interest.

* * *
The disparity of bargaining power has produced
an agreement which operates to substantially favor
the interests of the stronger party to the detriment
of the weaker.
In such case, the agreement deserves
the statutory assurance that good faith and fairness
will be preserved. Nhere the interests of the public
are so intimately involved, however, inequitable termination provisions must not be tolerated.
Independent Insurance Agen~y_Agreements & the T~rmina~
tion of Agency: Antiquated Approach to the Modern
Market, 49 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 286 (1969).
The recent case of Randolph v.

~ew

England

~utual

Life

Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383 (6th Cir. 1975) is on four squares with
the matter sub j udice.

This action, primarily for breach of contract.
has its origins in a long-time contractual association between the individual plaintiff-appellant
(usuallv hereinafter referred to as "Randolph''),
and his- father before him, with the defendantappellee insurance company (usually hereinafter
"'lEL")
~he fruits of the discoverv procedures earlier
referred to exhaustively chronicle the long and
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amicable relationship between the Randolchs
and NEL, and include many laudatory stat~nents
made by its hi~h officials, concerning the
Randolph agency's diligence, initiative and
e!fectiveness.
This long period of arniabilitv ended
July 15, 1969, abruptly or other-Wise; just
how abrupt and unforseen this occurre11ce was
depends upon which party's evidence is credited,
but this is an issue which need not ~e reached
here. Be that as it may, an ~EL vice-9resident,
bv letter of that date, advised Randolph that
·~e feel we have no alternative but to-nake a
chanae in the management of our Cincinnati Aaen~
now
and after SO!T\e further correspondence another
~EL vice-president, by letter dated-September 5,
196 9, exercised NEL' s 'right . . . to terminate t~e
agency upon giving sixty days' notice in writinrr',
the termination being effective November 4, 1%9.
I

,

The sole legal issue which requires resolution
is whether the contract executed April 27, 1969,
was terminated by unilateral action of either party
prior to its April 1, 1989 termination date, which
in turn requires an interpretation of Section 15 of
that Agreement. That section reads,
"The agency shall terminate automatically
the Normal Retirement Date or on the prior
death of the General Aaent, but except as
provided in Section 14-each of the carties
hereto shall have the riaht to terminate
the Aqen£_x_~~z:!X__prior time upon aiving.
sixty_da~.'._ notice in w~iting."
[Emphasis
from original] .
Although we hold that Section 15 authorizes ..
termination "without cause", we conclude that Secti~n,:
would not pert'lit either party to terminate in "bad ,a,.
Even with no definite duration provisions, what we
regard as the better reasonealine ol"C"as7s has
imposed a duty of good faith on the exercise of a515.
facially unrestricted termination cal use. [Ernpha
added.]
.
h arantinc
... For the reasons hereinabove
stated, t,e
of the motion for summary j udcrment was improper·
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?eversed and remanded for further proceedincs
not inconsistent herewith.
For other bad faith terr1ination cases, see:

Atkinson v.

Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 519 F.2d 1112
(5th Cir. 1975): Reese v. Bank Building
~~'
2rir:_~

332 F.2d 548

&

Eauipment Corp. of

(7th Cir. 1964): De'!'reville v. Outboard

Corp., 439 F.2d 1099 (dt!1 Cir. 1971); Zimmer v. '.•7ells

:!anaqement Corp.,

348 F.Supp. 540 (S.D. 'LY. 1972) ·

Hudson Sales Corp.,

~'1ilton

v.

313 P. 2d 936 (Cal. ;._pp. 1957): Philadelphia

Storage Battery v. Mutual Tire Stores, 159 S.E. 825 (S.C. 1931)'
J.R.

lvatkins Co. v. Rich, 254 Mich. 82, 235 N.'·7.

845 (1931)

(dictum) : Gellhorn, Lirni tations on Contract Termination Rights Franchise Cancellations, 1967 Duke L ••T.

465.~

cf.

Merrill v.

Continental Assurance Co., 200 Cal. App.2d 663, 19 Cal.
11962).

~ptr.

(Although the court found no evidence of bad faith, a

good faith obligation appears to have been applied.)

E.

The Trial Court Erred by Grantinq a Directed
Verdict On the Tort Claim for Bad Faith
Termination.

This is a case of first impression for Utah.

'!'he issue

is whether Utah will follow the lead of other states which
im;:iose a duty of good faith on the exercise of contractuaJ_
termination clauses.
Where the law is unsettled, this court should be more
concerned with what the law ouqht to be than what the law was
i1 the past.
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Although they have not spelled this out in
express languaae, the fact o: t'.'le ::iatter is th.at
the appellate state courts -- a rnajorit~ cf th.e~
at least -- have assumed responsibility for the
current condition of the CO!T'l"On law o: torts -its proper balancing of conpetina individual and
social interests, its satisfactory response to
current needs, and its attaining of current deals
Recognizing that the conmen law rules were court: ·
developed, usually some time aao, the courts are
consciously assuming the obligation of keeoinc
the rules up to C!ate.
- This, I suggest, is essentially to the good.
It is better. I think, for the courts openlv to
assume the duty of being the monitors of the
state of the cor:unon law and to accect the res::ionsibili ty for what they are doinq, tha~ to make chanaes
covertly by pretending that they are only statiM
what the law has been all along or are merely
declaring a change that has come about by the
self-unfolding of a legal idea.
Creation of a
new exception or expansion of an old one is
modifying the rule, as surely as frankly changino
it, because it has become outdated and obsolete.
If the courts understand that they must bear the
accountability for what they do, they may be
expected to be more careful and more responsible
than if they are able to cast off any censure by
the fiction that they are doing no more than
declarina what the law is and are not answerable
for its condition.
f'l"ade*, The ~1ost Important Tort
Chanqe in the Third Quarter of the Twentieth Centur]
20Kffi L. Rep. 413 (~av. 1977).
The lower court directed a verdict aaainst !-1ann. Thi:
Court should review the evidence in a light more favorable
to Mann.

oi Cl ou d v. Baum, 569 P . 2d ll?S
(Utah 1977) ;~·
Le
-

Parson Red-E-Mix Pavincr Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 :::·

* Distinauished Professor of Law, Vanderbilt UniversitV·
Reporter, JRestatement (Second) of Torts.
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The jury could easily have concluded t!"lat
terminated in bad faith.
to the jury.

'~ann

was

The fact issue should have gone

Utah shoulcl follow the !'1.odern view which holds

such bad faith termination to be tortious.
II.

THE CONTRACT

A.

Factual Basis for the Contract Claim.

Al though
agents.

CLAn~s

~1ann

was fired, American Western kept his sub-

After '.-!ann was fired, he received no more override

commissions on the sales of his sub-agents.

~lann

claimed that

he had a contractual right to keep receiving overrides even

after his termination.
Al though American Western had many sales agents, it had

(prior to '1ann) only one "general agent".

That origina.l ''general

agent" for American Western was called American International
Marketing (AD1l .
1·1estern

The "general agent., agreement between American

and AIM was executed in 1967 (Ex. 58-P).

Mann had

access to that "general agent" contract and was familiar with
its terms.

The AIM contract provides that the ··general agent·•

will continue to receive overrides even after termination.
On January 3, 19 7 5, Mann entered into an oral contract

Ireplacing two earlier written "agent" agreements) to become a

"general agent".

Y

Mann testified that he negotiated to get a contract
like AI'1".

(R. 1252

&

1287).

:1ann offered extensi•.re testimony

---

'.
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.
1 u d"ing an or-er
-~
.
inc
or- proor- -3/ that this

like AI~1".
testi:.".lony).

contr~ct

was

l US':

(See Appendix "A" for an extract of the relevan:
The AP1 contract was offered as an exhibit . .'..·e:

Western objected.

The objection was sustained.

After plaintiff's evide:ice, defendant made a motior.

tc

dismiss the contract claim on the g-rounds that no proof hac :'
offered as to the terms of the oral agreement

".'he !T\otion :::

a directed verdict on the contract claim was granted.
In surnnary, :1ann claimed that he had a contract 'v!":lc:.
would pay overrides even after his termination.

In order to

make that theory stick, Mann had to show that his oral contra::
was "just like" the AIH contract.

The trial court refused to

admit the AIM contract into evidence.

Without the AIM contra::

in evidence, Mann could not prove the terms of his oral acrm·'
Directed verdict was granted.
B.

The Written AIM Contract Was the Basis for the
Oral "General Agent'' Contract Between Mann and
American ~estern.

The general rule is that contracts cannot be proved by
evidence that one of the parties has made similar contracts•;::
other persons, unless there is a con.nection between the two
contracts, or unless it is probative that the course pursued
in one instance would be followed in another.
~9-.·--.Y_:__~~~pbell,

244 P. 1029 (Uta h 1926) .

Ogden

Co~

In th is case, the!;

The Court erred by not admitting the offer of pro~~S
Development CO!:£:_V· Mignot,
279 Or. 151, 566 P.~~

l/
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-lh.- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . .

.

3

sue:-: a con!1ection or probability.
AI~

contract "just like" the

Here plain ti ff denanded

contract.

This case is iC.entical to :-.lelsen v. FaTIT",ers
ins. co.,
---

::'L~<7.2d

4 lo/is. 2d 36, 90

123 (1958).

'~utual

Auto

In that case,

t:ie agent sued the insurance coropany for wronqful termination
o:' an oral agency contract.

At trial, a coMpa:-iy official

:esti'.:ied that the agents were offered similar oral cont:::-acts
a.nd that one agent denanded that his contract be ;iut in writing.
!he written contract was

into evidence.

introduced and accepted by the co·.irt

See also,

~illiston

on Contracts, 3d ed. § 4 7

(".:\n offer or agreement may also refer to another agreement for

a definition of terms ••• ") ; Schwartz Tailoring Co. v. Petty,
140 A.2d 63

(D.C. 1958)

("it is not necessary that a prornise

be certain within itself if it contains reference to another

agreement . . . from which the terms may be made clear. ") ·
~acht~~1edic~l

A9P· 438

(1963)

Building, Inc. v. Ked, 130 S.E.2d 530,

7~

Ga.

( " ... A contract may be made sufficiently certain

by reference to other documents". )

C.

The Trial Court Erred ~ Failing to Receive the
Contract Into Evidence.

AI~

The AD1 contract (Ex. 58-P) was offered but not received
into evidence.

(See generally Appendix "A" hereto).

It was

error for the Court not to receive the contract into evidence.
The general rule of law is that when the existence of
~ alleged oral contract is in issue, all the acts and declarations
Jf t!"ie parties tending to refute or establish it are admissible
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~

together with all the facts connected with the s urro•m<' inc
circumstances.
~re-Fit

4.38

17A, C.J.S. Contracts§ 593 p. 1156.

See,,

Door, Inc. v. Dor-Wavs, _Inc., 477 P.:2d 557, 13 Ariz.

(1970).
An early Utah case is squarely in ?Oint, Straw v. Terc
~

48 Utah 258, 159 P. 44

(1916).

In that case, plBintiff sue:

under the terms of an oral agreement.

Defendant adMitted th:

existence of an oral contract, but alleoed that the terms o'
the oral agreement were "identical" to a written agreement
between defendant and a third party.
to introduce the written contract.
An appeal resulted.

At trial defendant attn
'!'he contract was not rece:

The Supreme Court gave the =allowing ana:i

For the purpose of proving their claim in that
regard, counsel for defendants, in various ways,
attempted to introduce the contract and specifications pleaded in their answer.
Plaintiff's counsel,
however, objected to the proffered evidence upon
the ground that the contracts referred to were
between other parties, and hence were "immaterial
and irrelevant".
The court it seems, adopted the
view of plaintiff's counsel and excluded the
proffered evidence in whatever form it was offered.

* * *
From what he did say it is quite clear that the
ruling is erroneous according to the ~est elementary
principles of law.
Quite true plaintiff could not
be bound by the terms and conditions of contra7t7
made between others with whom he was not in pnvity,
but the defendants by their offer did not seek to 7°h
bind him.
All they attempted to do was to establl~· ,,
the terms of plaintiff's own contract as the defen ~;
claimed them to be and thus bind him by those te::
the jury should find them to be as con tended by he
defendants.
In order to so bind the plaintiff· t
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de endants were required to prove at least two
th ngs:
(1) What the terms, conditions, and
st pulations of the contract they referred to
in their answer were; and (2) that the olaintiff
and the defendants had adopted such te~.s, conditions and stipulations as part of the parol
contract sued on.
To show the first was as
necessary as it was to prove the second, and
it would be utterly useless to prove one unless
the other was also proved.

* * *
The court, therefore, col'\IT\itted manifest error
in excluding the defendants' proffered evidence
bv which they sought to prove the terms, conditions and stipulations-of the contracts referred
to in the answer.

* * *
... defendants had the riqht to establish those
facts by any competent and material evidence at
their command.
That right was denied them. We
cannot say what conclusion the jury might have
reached if the excluded evidence had been admitted.
We think, therefore, that the trial court was
clearly in error in excluding defendants' proffered
evidence, and that the error was prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the defendants.
III.

THE RESTITUTION CLAIM

Plaintiff's third claim was entitled TerMination After
~~_tial Performance.

That claim was dismissed on the face

of the pleadings without receiving any evidence on the issues.
(",.1376, 1447).

A.

Factual Basis For the Restitution Claim.

Since the claim was dismissed without evidence, this

Court must review the allegations in the liaht most favorable
to

0 laintiff.

Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 207, 398 P.2d 207

'"SI; HU£St~~way Dept. 16 Utah 2d 153, 397 P.2d 71

(1964).
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The followino allegations are pertinent·
The life insurance industry is generally characteri;o
by a high turnover in sales agents.

A substantial cost is
~~

required to locate, recruit and train new sales aqents.

more, new sales agents generally require loans or advances'
several :nonths until they begin to earn cornITlissions · thus::'
turnover in agents represents a major expense to
companies generally.

(P..

insur~~

198-204, Third Amended Complaint,

'! 12) .
In order to avoid such ecpenses, defendant develoi;ied:
unique program involving defendant's general aqents.

~he

purpose of the program is to shift its high expense of new
agent turnover from the insurance company to the general ace·
(R. 198-204, Third Amended Complaint, 'I 13).
Pursuant to the policy, the general acrent bears the
administrative costs of finding and training new snb-agents.
Defendant sometimes makes lo~ns or advances to help new sub·)
get started.

Howevever, the general acrent guarantees all~

loans and repays defendant if the sub-agent defaults.
204, Third Amended Complaint,

~I

1~.::

14) .

Plaintiff has acted as a general agent for defendant:
accordance with the foregoing policy.

Pursuant to this pol::

plaintiff has expended substantial sums to locate, recruit'
train new sub-agents.

Plaintiff has also cruaranteed manY ::

made by defendant to such new sub-agents.

( R.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

198-204' :'

:_--;e~.cec

complain':,

'!

15) .

Plaintif:'s only coMpensation for such financial corl'lit;ients and labors is the override corl'lis.sion which plaintiff
receives on future sales made by sub-agents.
Thi re .:'.\mended Car.plaint,

(~.

198-204'

'I 16) .

Plaintiff has performed the following services :or t!'le
iefendant:
(a)

Conducted advertising prograMs to solicit

new sub-agents for defendant·
(b)

Recruited and signed up approximately 300 new

sub-agents for defendant;
sub-agents~

(c)

Provided training programs for new

(d)

Provided personal financial guarantees and

other financial commitments to the said 300 new subagents;
(e)

Supervised the sales activities of the said 300

new sub-agents;
(f)

Spent his own funds for office, travel and other

expenses associated with items (a) through (e) above.
(R. 198-204, Third A.mended Complaint.

4[

29).

Plaintiff has duly performed all of the conditions of the
said oral contract alleged in paragraph 9 of the '!'hird Amended
~Mplaint so far as he was permitted to do so by defendant.
1
"·

198-204, Third Amended Complaint, '[ 30).
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Defendant has in bad faith terminated plaintiff anc
ordered him to refrain fror. the performance of any further
service under his general agent's contract and by the

sa~

acts rendered in impossible for plaintiff to complete performance thereof.
B.

(R. 198-204, Third Amended Complaint, ,, ;

The Trial Court Erred in Dismissin<J
for Restitution.

~1ann'

s Claic

The facts as pleaded set up a clai.r:i for restitution.
~he

cause is governed by § 1109 of Corbin on Contracts.
One who has rendered service or supplied work,
labor, and materials under a contract with another,
but who has been wrongfully discharged or otherwise
prevented from so far fully performing as to earn
the agreed compensation, may regard the contract
as terminated and get judqrnent for the reasonable
value of all that the defendant has received in
performance of the contract. This rule is applicable
to contracts of personal service and to all kinds of
construction contracts.
The defendant's breach Mav
have been a repudiation, a discharqe, a preventi~
of performance by the plaintiff, or a failure to
perform the agreed exchange due from the defendant ..
Nevertheless, if the defenant has committed a vital
breach that prevents the express contract debt from.
arising the court will value the performance rendere'.
by the plaintiff and COIT'lpel the defendant to make
restitution of the a.Il)Ount •.
Under the contract, a "general agent" has four respo~:

bilities:

(1)

sales agents,

to recruit new sales agents,

(2) to train ne·i

( '3) to finance new sales agents (by loans or

guarantees, and ( 4) to provide on-going supervision of sale:
agents.

In return for these services, the "general agent":'

paid an override commission on future sales of his aoents.
When ~1ann was fired, he had col'.'.pleted three of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

responsibilities.

hl

5

He had recruited, trained and fin~c~

1

0 ~ sales agents.

He would ha'1e provided the continuing

supervision but was fired and denied the opportunity to supervise.
A court of equity might conclude that Mann has already
delivered 75% of the value of his bargain -- i.e., he has
recruited, trained, financed sales

agents.~/

Since !1ann is

prevented from completing the remaining 25% of his bargain
(supervision) he gets no future override commissions under
t~

contract.

But, the court may place a value on the 75%

which was already performed and repay

~ann

for the value of

those services.
CONCLUSION
The Court erred by dismissing Mann's claim for
restitution.

Mann should have been permitted to present his

evidence to establish a claim in equity.
The Court further erred by refusing to admit the AB~
contract into evidence.

Without that contract, Mann could not

prove the terms of his oral contract, and a verdict was directed
against Mann on the counterclaim.
The Court further erred by directing a verdict on the
tort claim of bad faith termination.

A jury could reasonable

infer that Mann was terminated in bad faith for the purpose

--

4/
: The remaining duty was suoervision, but the record shows
-!lat general agents perform only nominal supervisory duties.
IR. 1046 lines 5-15).
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of cutting hi::'.'! out of his future overrides.

:''.1e issue s~o,;;

have gone to the jury.
DATED this 2nd day of March, 1978.

Respectfully submitted,

/

'..<./ -.

L)..___I,

~

.:_1

This is to certify that I mailed two copies of the
foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant to Randy L. Dryer,
attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 455 South 300 East. Salt
Lake City, Utah

84111, this 2nd

prepaid and properly addressed.
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T!<.A.'JSCRIPT OF RE:.EVA..'l'T TES':'IMONY REG.:l.2D!)IG ADM:SS!ON CF
EXHIBIT 58.

Q

Tell the jury what ;.;as said by ':!'le ?a=tiss on

c:iat occasion.
A

:.tr. :1atheson !lad wri-:ten dcwr. ·On :;:;a;::er a

?rO?csed general agent's contract starting at 94 ;::ercen': and,
based on •1olume, working up to l·'.JO ?ercent.
that was not acceptable at that time, but I

I

told Frank

~anted

a contrac':

just like AIM' S.
Q

And who is AIM?

A

American International !1arketing.

And he agreed

that he could give :ne_ a contract--he could not gi •1e me one
just like

AI~'s

because of the conflict with the S percent.

He agreed to give :ne a hundred percent ar.d :nake some ccn-

cessions for the other S percent.

Ar.d ':::iat 's I':em

~ro.

2,

which, as it says in his notes, "concessions to his agency,"
he would advance my agents on submit business and he would

advance the managers overrides as a concession.

t<e

Q

Anything else said during the meeting?

A

Yes.

We discussed a 1-percent office allowance.

talked a:icut the straight commission on m.y 9 88 account,

3.!ld ::i.e was worried about that balance.

So was !.

He wanted

:'.lat worked off .

.What ·.ras
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Q

988 account?

.:;

:'~at was

t.:'"le

.3.C::8'-!r:":

:.~--:.J.~

;c~s

::a::~

·~;·
......

::

account?

produced, and there was probably two o::: :h.:ee thousa::C: :: ...
there could have been more, that I cwec the ccrn 9 any on:.~::
account.

c~.

So he wanted ::ie tc ·,;c::-:: it o·-.:t

3.

s::"-:;::: ::::.

basis.
Q

Anything else saii?

general agent's contract, that I would '.':ave to 11aca:e

t~e

office space at the home office.

Q

Did he tell you why?

A

Yes.

Q

What did he say?

A

The other general agent :el t that I had un!a::

advantage in that I had a free office space.

And they sa::

if you are going to go ahead with this thing, ycu are ~c:;:
to have to make hi:n get out of there--which :: ag:-eed

1

':C ::

subsequently leased office space from the company next :cc:
Q

Do you remember anything else a!:out the mee:::

.~

Only that in his notes he says,

Q

~et :ne as;. you:

consider."

in the upoer

right-ha~d co:::~er

..
Yet.: nc':ice
a:::e scme

0:1

t::-.e w::::a:.

::;~res,

been :<'d out.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

j

d

M~.

DeBRY:

I show the jury, ycur

~ay

THE COURT:

~onor?

Let me see what you are re:e=:::-ing to.

Any objection?
~R.

PRI~CE:

~o.

Q

Do you remember why those figures were X'd out?

A

Yes.

They were the

had of:ered and I told

prelL~inary

!igures that he

were unacceptable, and sc when

hL~

he said we will go ahead with the 100 percent ·..ri':..."lc•.it having

to wcr.'< our way up, he crossed them out.
Q

Okay.

Now, was any conclusion reached?

A

No.

Q

What was--

A

I said that I would think it over, and that after-

noon I stuck my head in the door and said, "Frank, we have
got a deal.

I will move next door.

We can arrange for the

rental of the office space."
(R. 1252-1254).

*

*

*

Now, I'm going to show you what was marked

Q

yesterday but not put into evidence as Exhibit 58.

Can you

identify that?
A

Yes, that's the general agent agreement between

American Wester.l Life Insurance Company and
~ar~eting.

.~erican

International

It is a general agent's agreement.
Q

Okay.

Are you generally fami:iar with the ter.ns

and conditions of that agreement?
A

Yes.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q

And how

you
i i i

fami:iar

chat document?

.a..

As director of 3.cencies
I had
-

American International

~arketing

and divisional managers.

su~e~·1 ; 5 ;
C""
...... on

branch, dis-:=ict, r:!si::.,

On occasion, there ·,;er-e auesr"·
. ..

~.,;

about the status of A.'Ilerican I:-iternational :-tar:<:etl:ig
general agent's contract.

~:

a~c

:·

I had to be : ami liar wit:i 0:;e ::·

so that I could intelligently discuss them.
Q

American

l\nd where was the document located at ti:e

Wes~ern

A
International

Li!e

Insur3.~Ce

Company o::ices?

It was located in the file ·.inde!'

.::l,rneri~a"

~arketing.

Q

And did you have access to that file?

A

Yes.

Q

And on how many occasions during your

employment did you have occasion to get into that file and
review that document?
A

I can't be certain as to how many times exa(:.

Frank had given me a copy of it because he and I :iad disc::
it many times, and I had a copy of it in my file in my a::::
Q

Now, is that the document you were talk:::g a:

when you said to Mr. Matheson, "I want a contract ~ike ;::!'

A

That's the document.

That' s the or.ly ;ene:a:

agent's contract I am familiar with.
Q

Is that the document you were talking a::ioc::

A

That's the document.

MR.

~eBRY:

~R.

PR!~CE:

Offer 58.

r will obJect to that.
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think there is a ?roper foundation at this

tL~e.

(". 1256-1257).

*
Q

~r.

*

*

Mann, this morning you testified about a

couple of meetings that took place on a day in January 1974.
I

Q
had a

:i.

'5.

After those

~eetings,

dij you

thi~k

you

contract?
A

Yes.

Q

Afid what was ycur

understandi~?

o:

the

~er:ns

a~d

conditions of that contract?
!1R.

I will objer:t to that.

PRI~iCE:

I think

he's already testified as to what matters were discussed and
what was agreed upon.
('.l..

1283).

*

*

*

~R.

DeBRY:

May I proceed?

THE

COURT:

You may proceed.

MR. DeBRY:

As I recall, Your Senor, t!le

initial foundation question to

~r.

Mann was:

you had a contract after the meeting?
The next question was:

Did ycu t!"l:.nk

The answer was:

Yes.

What was your understanding of the

ter.ns and conditions of the contract?
If the ,.,itness had been per:nit.ted to answer,

cs

'::"\at t'.':e ter:ns and conditions of my con tract 'N"ere exactl:;t

:i~e ':~e A~~

contract with some exceptions."
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·,ica~

''

'°"'

1,1

:-ie ·..,.cu.:.d '.'lave

answered,

"In general,

exclusive.

~y

;enera: agent's

ccn~=ic: ""U

I would not serve on t'.'1e executi·:e ccr..r.iit:ee,

did not want to •.ise the na.'lle American West, and : ·,..as r.ot
participating i:l the stock options."

His fu:::-t=:er a::.s·•e:

would be that, those were all exceptio::s to t:-ie wri::en

~!

then ,.-ould '::e t::at his '..lr.de=standing is t::-,at :-.e ::ad an

a~::·

just li:<e Ex!'libit 58 wit:i t:ie listed
poi::t I ·.,.ould have offered t.'1e
(R.

A!~1

exce~-:io:-.s,

a:

wn:c:.

agreer::ent i:-.l:.c a•ridence.

132'-'.).

*

*

*

The record will show the proffer anC. you:
acceptance of the Court' s ruling and your continuing object:
The previous ruling will

too.

,

stand.~

(-R. - 1336).

l

The court erred in exclusing the
Kabil i::evelo-oment Cor.;. v. ~-h::rnot,
See:
for an example squarelf i:: :;ioint.
l9i7)
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